The foreign banks from many countries may be pressing hard for liberalised Indian banking rules to venture into or expand in the domestic market, but it has not been an easy task for State Bank of India, the country’s largest bank, to set up normal banking activities in some developed countries.
Of late, the bank, which has a presence in 30 countries, has faced regulatory resistance in three countries -- US, Singapore and Australia – in its foray into full-fledged banking operations.
More interesting part here
In the US also, the bank’s long-drawn efforts to expand its operations have not succeeded so far. Earlier, US authorities had not allowed the bank’s move a few years ago of expanding its activities saying that it has to put up a complete secured system to prevent money laundering and fraudulent activities.
Though the bank has already complied with the US authorities’ instructions on this front, there is no change of stance by the authorities.
“They are not telling us clearly what is preventing them from giving us more freedom to expand our activities,’’ said sources at SBI.
In fact, observers point out that the attitude of several banking regulators towards Indian banks in recent times has compelled Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to adopt counter measures by not allowing foreign banks to expand their operations in domestic market.
“It is ok, if it is a tit for tat by the RBI. But RBI should allow expansion of at least those banks which belong to countries where Indian banks are not facing any problems,’’ commented a prominent foreign banker.
The last comment by the prominent foreign banker reminded me of prisoners dilemma ( Wikipedia). I would suggest you to read the whole thing, or atleast this
In his book The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), Robert Axelrod explored an extension to the classical PD scenario, which he called the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD). In this, participants have to choose their mutual strategy again and again, and have memory of their previous encounters. Axelrod invited academic colleagues all over the world to devise computer strategies to compete in an IPD tournament. The programs that were entered varied widely in algorithmic complexity; initial hostility; capacity for forgiveness; and so forth.
Axelrod discovered that when these encounters were repeated over a long period of time with many players, each with different strategies, "greedy" strategies tended to do very poorly in the long run while more "altruistic" strategies did better, as judged purely by self-interest. He used this to show a possible mechanism for the evolution of altruistic behaviour from mechanisms that are initially purely selfish, by natural selection.
The best deterministic strategy was found to be "Tit for Tat", which Anatol Rapoport developed and entered into the tournament. It was the simplest of any program entered, containing only four lines of BASIC, and won the contest. The strategy is simply to cooperate on the first iteration of the game; after that, the player does what his opponent did on the previous move. A slightly better strategy is "Tit for Tat with forgiveness". When the opponent defects, on the next move, the player sometimes cooperates anyway, with a small probability (around 1%-5%). This allows for occasional recovery from getting trapped in a cycle of defections. The exact probability depends on the line-up of opponents. "Tit for Tat with forgiveness" is best when miscommunication is introduced to the game — when one's move is incorrectly reported to the opponent.
I dont know if this is also an example of Beggar thy neighbour policies.
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